Josip Broz Tito in the German Democratic Republic in 1965

Abstract

The paper analyzes, on the basis of Yugoslav and German sources, as well as relevant literature, Josip Broz Tito’s visit to the German Democratic Republic in June 1965, including its announcement, preparations, course, and the reactions and consequences it had for Yugoslavia’s relations with the two German states. Particular attention is devoted to the reasons that influenced the Yugoslav leadership in deciding to make an official visit to East Berlin, while also highlighting the significance of the visit for Belgrade and East Berlin, as well as for Bonn.

Summary: Josip Broz Tito’s visit to the German Democratic Republic in June 1965 was a significant event not only in Yugoslav–East German relations, but also in the broader context of inter-German relations, the foreign policies of East and West Germany, and Yugoslav policy toward the German question and European security. It was the first official visit to East Germany by the leader of a country that was not a member of the Eastern Bloc and was therefore of exceptional importance for strengthening the legitimacy of the East German authorities. In view of this, the East Germans were prepared, in the interest of international prestige, to set ideological and other disagreements aside in the period preceding the visit. Nevertheless, the visit did not bring immediate benefits to the East German regime. For the government in Bonn, it represented the most direct interference in German national affairs and a challenge to German unity. Bonn’s attitude toward Yugoslavia remained reserved in the months following Tito’s visit, particularly with regard to numerous outstanding bilateral issues. However, previously agreed financial and trade agreements were not canceled. For the Yugoslav side, Tito’s visit to the German Democratic Republic was part of its rapprochement with the East, but also a manifestation of Yugoslavia’s position on the German question and an expression of its European policy. It represented a deliberate attempt to put pressure on Bonn with the aim of undermining the Hallstein Doctrine, while simultaneously supporting a socialist, “peaceful” Germany that would not seek to revise existing borders, thereby contributing to security on the European continent. The visit was a deliberate step toward strengthening East Germany’s international position as a counterweight to West Germany, while at the same time reflecting Yugoslavia’s effort to preserve its own non-aligned position.